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Na Ãbõ Ã, eighteenth century Ottoman divanõ Ã poet
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Crowned with an imposing citadel, Aleppo made a lasting impression on all who caught their ®rst glimpse of it during the Ottoman period. Many of the city's houses, mosques, churches, and markets were built of locally quarried stone. This feature provided the city both with an air of permanence and its sobriquet, Halab al-Shaba',``Aleppo, the milky-white.'' The nickname presumed a pun on the city's name which in Arabic is also the word for milk. This linguistic coincidence, in turn, ®t well into the local myth of origin, current in the Ottoman period, that held that the city had been founded when the Prophet Abraham had milked his goats on the citadel mound. In fact, the association of some form of that name to the site goes back to the beginnings of recorded history In the Ottoman centuries, Aleppo had surrounding gardens, watered by Map 1 Aleppo 18 the now largely vanished Quwayq River, but they lacked the verdant appearance of Damascus's Ghuta. From a distance, the city struck most visitors as austere and with little charm. All whose impressions have survived commented on its solidity, order, and cleanliness. Few besides Na Ãbõ Ã, however, penned odes to its beauty. The Aleppines themselves responded to the somber vision their city projected. In their poetry and folk-sayings, they evoked and then carefully cultivated a self-image of themselves as townsmen blessed with sobriety, frugality, and honesty. Most foreign visitors agreed the stereotype was appropriate. These were traits suitable for inhabitants of a city whose renown was vested neither in political nor cultural greatness, but in its trade. Aleppo's importance as a commercial center in the Ottoman period arose both from its geographical setting and historical developments. The city's probable beginnings stretch back to the origins of urban life in the Middle East. Aleppo was already a major regional market center at the beginning of the second millennium B.C.E., when the archives of the Hittites and of those of the kingdom of Mari recorded its name as Halab or Khalappa. One reason for the city's longevity was its tell (the arti®cial mound upon which its citadel now sits) which was buttressed by several smaller, surrounding hills. Together, they provided one of the best defensive positions in the region. Adding to its defenses, the Quwayq and underground wells provided an abundant and dependable water supply to the site. The combination proved irresistible and guaranteed the location's almost unbroken habitation. Often devastated by marauders, Aleppo was always rebuilt.
The wider geography of the region also served to establish Aleppo as a commercial center. The city is almost equidistant from the Euphrates and the Mediterranean Sea which together provided a route water borne traf®c could follow with only a short dry land portage passing by Aleppo. The wisdom of this route was evident to many and it formed the most traveled path for trade along the fabled Silk Road between Asia and Europe from at least the early Bronze Age until the arrival of the Ottomans. Adding to the viability of the site, extensive areas of fertile soil surround the city. Beyond them, lie the olive and mulberry orchards of the hill country to the west, and southwest. Aleppo's craftsmen fashioned the fruits of these into soap and silk cloth, the quality of which gained a regional reputation for excellence. To the north, east, and south, the region's diverse tribal peoples: Bedouin, Kurds, and Turkomans, utilized the steppe lands bordering the desert as pasturage for their herds. The tribals sold wool, meat, and rugs to the city-dwellers and provided the pack-animals and the expertise necessary for the caravan trade. They, in turn, were consumers of the manufacture of the city's renowned tent, sword, and saddle-makers. This symbiotic relationship between``desert and sown'' allowed Aleppo to function as a desert`p ort city.'' But at the same time, resources of water and easily accessible food, coupled with a defensible location, afforded the city's inhabitants an independence from the tribal chieftains who often interfered in the politics of the less self-suf®cient market towns to Aleppo's north or south, Killis and Hama.
3
Despite its geographical advantages and antiquity, Aleppo rarely served either as the pre-eminent economic or political center of greater Syria. Usually, a more successful rival ± Antioch in the classical period, Damascus in most of the Muslim centuries ± overshadowed it. After its occupation by a Muslim army in 637, Aleppo stood on the borders of Christendom and Islam. During the Crusades, Aleppo's citadel which was rebuilt by the Zangids (1128±83) and strengthened by the Ayyubids (1183±1260) stood as a bulwark of Islam against the Franks who held nearby Antioch. The Crusaders besieged the city on several occasions, but its garrison, secure behind the citadel's walls, was able to resist until help arrived. Aleppo was not as lucky with invaders from the east. The city was sacked with much of its population killed or carried away into slavery by the forces of Hu È legu È (1260) and then Timur (1401). In between, a particularly devastating outbreak of the bubonic plague struck its population in 1348. Nonetheless, people returned and rebuilt the city after each trauma.
Following the Crusades and again in the wake of Timur's devastation, the Mamluk dynasty (1260±1517) with its capital in Cairo sought to revive Aleppo as the northern anchor of the realm. Enjoying the patronage of the Mamluk beys, the city entered into a period of prosperity, previously unparalleled in the Muslim centuries. Although the shift in trade routes that would bring this about were already in motion before Timur's visitation, the prolonged peace that followed it provided the necessary climate for commerce to¯ourish. An important boost to Aleppo's position as a commercial center came with the fall of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia to the Mamluks in 1375. With the destruction of Ayas, its port city, merchants carrying Asian merchandise to the Mediterranean shifted their route south to Aleppo. In recognition of Aleppo's position in its expanding trade network, the Venetian senate appointed a vice-consul to the city by the end of the fourteenth century, in time to witness the city's sack by Timur. That of®ce was upgraded to a full consulate by 1422. 4 The principal products the Italians sought in Aleppo's markets were ginger and pepper from India and the East Indies (earning the town the nickname,``Little India''), Iranian raw silk, and Syrian cotton. The leading European exports to Syria in this period were Italian silk cloths, tin, and specie.
Although Damascus remained the paramount provincial capital of greater Syria throughout the Mamluk period, Aleppo bene®ted architecturally from the patronage of the Mamluk beys who built mosques and madrassahs, and perhaps more importantly for the city's commercial future, embarked on a building program to expand and improve the city's markets. This patronage re¯ected their recognition that Aleppo was already beginning to surpass Damascus as the regional emporium for Asian products. This development had not occurred out of any conscious policy the Mamluks had implemented, but rather came from the growing insecurity on the alternative land routes. The overland caravan routes from the Hijaz and Baghdad that had helped to make Damascus and its satellite port of Beirut major Levantine emporia in the early Mamluk period were increasingly plagued in the ®fteenth century by a resurgence of Bedouin military power and were no longer entirely safe or reliable.
Despite the commercial prosperity Aleppo enjoyed, the ®nal decades of Mamluk rule were despotic and often cruel for its inhabitants. Aleppo's citizenry were, therefore, not at all sorry when the army of the Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim I (1512±20) defeated the Mamluk Sultan, Qansuh al-Ghawri, on the ®eld of Marj Dabiq in 1516. After the battle, the local notables welcomed the Ottoman sultan with feasts that lasted several days and gifts of silken robes. With the conquest of Syria and Egypt a year later, the entire eastern littoral of the Mediterranean was ®rmly in Ottoman hands, leaving the Ottoman state as the only major Muslim Mediterranean power. Sultan Kanu Ã nõ Ã Su È leyman (1520±66) extended Ottoman hegemony even further, to Iraq and both coasts of the Red Sea. With Ottoman suzerainty projecting over the sea lanes and caravan routes to the east, the Empire had become a world power, ready to challenge the expansion of European interests into the Indian Ocean.
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The replacement of one sultan by another did not initially signal any major revision of Aleppo's historical political subordination to Damascus. Following the precedents established by the Mamluk regime, the Ottomans placed Aleppo under the authority of Damascus's governor. This decision most probably re¯ected several realities. First, the Ottomans were politically conservative and rarely altered pre-existing administrative practices in the regions they conquered. This was especially true for regions that were already under a Muslim government at the time of their conquest. In addition, Damascus held the prestige both for having once served as Islam's capital under the Umayyads (681±750) and as the principal starting point for the annual pilgrimage caravan to the holy city of Mecca. It would be reasonable, therefore, for the sultans to recognize Damascus's regional position by naming its governor as the paramount governor of Syria. But events would prove that decision short sighted.
With the accession of Su È leyman to the Ottoman throne in 1520, the governor of Damascus, the former Mamluk Janbirdi al-Ghazali, rose in rebellion, declaiming that his oath of fealty to Selim did not extend to his son. The of®cer in charge of Aleppo, Karaca Ahmed Paa, refused to follow al-Ghazali's standard. When the Damascene forces reached the city, he barred the city's gates and rallied the townspeople to support the Ottoman claim to Aleppo. Damascus was soon after subdued and sacked by an Ottoman army sent to relieve Aleppo. Perhaps in recognition that the Empire needed an alternative power center in Syria to forestall any equally ambitious governor in Damascus, Aleppo was upgraded to a full provincial capital by 1534, with its governor and chief judges appointed directly from Istanbul and responsible, in turn, to authorities in Istanbul rather than in Damascus.
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The treasury of the province, however, remained linked to that of Damascus for some time to come, under the rubric of the Arabistan defterdarõ. This of®ce was located in Aleppo, but held the responsibility for the collection of all the revenues of greater Syria and northern Iraq until 1567.
7 Besides a generalized Ottoman tendency toward bureaucratic inertia, the reasons for the maintenance of the older Mamluk practice in regards to revenue are unclear. Even more uncertain are the reasons why Aleppo was chosen to house it over Damascus. That decision, however, continued to confuse the issue of the individual prerogatives of each provincial governor in Syria. After the separation of the two provincial treasuries, the governors of Damascus would periodically claim the right to collect taxes in Aleppo's hinterlands. This situation was aggravated by an unequal balance of forces available to each governor. For most of the sixteenth century, the sultans garrisoned their special infantry units in Syria, the janissaries, primarily in southern Syria: Damascus, Palestine, and along the hajj route, rather than in relatively tranquil northern Syria.
8 As such, the province of Aleppo was continually subjected to forays by Damascus based troops to collect taxes while its governors were either hard pressed to respond or completely impotent to stop them.
The sixteenth century: becoming Ottoman
Before their conquest of Syria, the Ottomans had accumulated several centuries of experience in empire building. This led them to absorb newly conquered territories in either of two ways. Either they incorporated the territories directly into their provincial administration, or they left them in the hands of regional political elites who predated the conquests. In the latter case, the locals collected revenues in the sultan's name, but otherwise enjoyed a high degree of regional autonomy. By contrast, the ®rst method always entailed a careful survey of the territory conquered and its subsequent subdivision into agricultural units (timars). These timars might consist of entire villages which the state would assign to loyal, often Turkish-speaking, cavalrymen as salary in return for military service. Through this method, the cash-strapped state could avoid paying its military with coin. At the same time, the ®scal system helped to incorporate the conquered region into the body-politic of the empire through the settlement of individuals faithful to the sultan. In the Balkans, this process could hasten a cultural Turki®cation of the local population as in the case of parts of Bulgaria, or their conversion to Islam, as happened in Bosnia and Albania.
The absorption of Syria into the Ottoman Empire presented challenges different from those previously experienced by the state. Historically, the Empire had expanded as a result of gaza (holy war) into the Christian Balkans, or wars against other Turkic dynasties in Anatolia with whom the Ottomans shared a language and a political culture. With the conquest ®rst of Syria, then Egypt, and later still Iraq, the Ottomans found themselves ruling over a subject people who, even though they were fellow Muslims, were heirs to a sophisticated urban culture, expressed in the Arabic language. The Ottomans arrived in Syria with an equally well-articulated vision of Islam and the political nature of the sultanate, as well as with a rich, secular, artistic culture of their own. The Ottoman tradition had evolved in Anatolia under the in¯uence of myriad, and very diverse, traditions: Persian, Byzantine, Turkic, Mongol, but had drawn little direct inspiration from the Arab lands. As a result, the Ottomans and their new Arab subjects could have divergent understandings of what it meant to be Muslim. Of course, Ottoman culture also contained a strong strain of Sunni legalism which the Ottoman elite shared with urban Syrians. Signi®cant differences existed even there, however, as the Syrian Muslims historically followed the Shafa«i school of Islamic law while the of®cial law school of the Ottoman state was Hana®.
Although all the Syrian lands were surveyed almost immediately following their conquest, the Ottomans showed some initial ambivalence about which provincial system was to be implemented. After al-Ghazali's revolt in 1520, however, the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo were provided with Turkish-speaking Ottomans as governors and the timar regime was instituted. The application of the conventional Ottoman patterns of provincial governance drew interior Syria securely into the Ottoman orbit.
9 Their provincial administrations were headed by Turkishspeaking Ottomans and Turkish-speaking cavalrymen were settled in many of the villages of the provinces of Damascus and Aleppo. The governors of other Arabic-speaking provinces were often drawn, by contrast, from local elites: mamluks in the case of Egypt and Baghdad, tribal chieftains in the provinces of Tripoli in Lebanon and Basra in Iraq.
This absorption of Aleppo into the Ottoman Empire introduced a new class of individuals, Ottoman, i.e. Turkish-speaking, soldiers and bureaucrats into the city's population mixture. These were collectively called``rijal al-Bab'' (men of the gate)
10 by the native Aleppines. Although twentiethcentury Arab historians often see these Ottomans as occupiers and the precursors of later European imperialists, 11 it is not at all evident that Arabic-speakers in Aleppo in the ®rst centuries of Ottoman rule considered their new masters to be completely alien. They clearly recognized, however that the``Ottomans'' were ethnically differentiated from themselves as is indicated by their general assignation of``Rum'' (Anatolian) to the Ottomans. That difference was especially noted when Ottoman jurists proposed interpretations of Islamic law that ran counter to the tradition of law as practiced in the Arabic-speaking urban centers.
12 The actual Arabic word for``Ottoman,'' either «Uthmani or «Uthmanli, was rarely used in Aleppo until the eighteenth century.
The differences and similarities that existed between these two formidable Sunni cultures, one articulated in Ottoman Turkish and represented by thè`m en of the gate,'' and the other in Arabic, no doubt created ambivalence for the contemporary Syrians over their incorporation into the Empire. While the Mamluks and their predecessors had relied on the Muslim intelligentsia of Syria's cities to de®ne the state, the Ottoman sultans already had a Turkish-speaking Sunni elite to advise them on matters pertaining to law and political traditions. Rather, it was up to the Syrians to negotiate a middle ground for themselves that would allow for the maintenance of their positions of in¯uence through service to the state. But Syria's own Islamic traditions and history also gave it a pedigree the Ottoman could not ignore, nor the Syrians forget. Some sort of balance had, by necessity, to be reached by both sides.
13 Surprisingly, perhaps, linguistic differences between ruler and ruled never apparently engendered ethnic con¯ict, at least not until the late nineteenth century. This has at least two plausible explanations. First, the Muslims in the city regarded the regime in Istanbul as being legitimately Muslim and its sultan was, therefore, their sultan. Here the role of Muslim Holy Law (S xeriat) as the ideological underpinning of the state was crucial in winning the allegiance of the sultans' Arab subjects. A second, and perhaps equally important reason was that the Ottoman administration in Aleppo had, at its fringe, a large number of local people who bene®ted from that regime's control of their city. The Turkish-speaking governors were rotated so frequently that some of those assigned to the city never arrived. In their stead, effective administration was administered by the kaim-makam (literally,``standing in the place of '') and the muhassil (tax-collector), both of whom were often of local origin. Similarly, while the chief kadi of the city was always a Turkish-speaking appointee from the capital, most of his lieutenants, as well as the city's lesser kadis were local Arabs. In this way, the Aleppines were able to mediate the Ottoman centuries, taking over the de facto running of their city, even while serving under the supervision of the``men of the gate.'' Yet there can be no question that the presence of these of®cial Ottomans from Istanbul had an impact on the city in ways that the presence of the Mamluk emirs had not. Aleppo's Muslim elite sent their sons to be educated in the madrassahs of Istanbul and other Anatolian religious centers, especially Konya. The inevitable result was an``Ottomanization,'' i.e. Turki®cation, of much of the popular culture of Aleppo as the two languages and traditions came face to face in daily interactions. Typical of this hybridization, Syrian mosques built in the Ottoman period re¯ected Ottoman architectural tastes: Byzantine domes and pencil-shaped minarets, but retained indigenous architectural details in their wall tiles and the characteristically Syrian black and white striped exteriors. They were, in effect, like the elite who helped design and later staffed them, both Ottoman and Syrian. From music to food, from political and legal theory to coffeehouse entertainment, in the su® religious orders that¯ourished in the city and the religious heresies adopted by villagers in the countryside, there was little in northern Syrian culture that was not in some way in¯uenced by the cross-fertilization from Anatolia, a process accelerated by Ottoman control of both sides of the linguistic divide between Arabs and Turks.
Having secured Aleppo as an integral province of the Empire, the 13 I derive this conception of mediation between two cultures from Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650±1815 (Cambridge, 1991), p. x.
Ottoman elites viewed the city and its commerce as a good investment for both this world and the next. Over the course of the ®rst decades of Ottoman rule, successive governors added greatly to both the city's skyline and commercial infrastructure. Hu È srev Pas xa in 1546 and Mehmed Pas xa in 1556 established pious endowments (waqf ) which ®nanced the construction of new mosques in the Ottoman style. Mehmed Pas xa, established a waqf for the caravansary (khan), known locally as the Khan al-Gumruk in 1574. The Khan al-Gumruk was the city's largest commercial edi®ce and served as the residence for many European merchants over the following three centuries. Yet another governor, Behram Pas xa, established both a mosque and extensive market complex in 1583. All told, construction in the ®rst half century of Ottoman rule more than doubled the commercial core of Aleppo, called by locals simply``the city'' (al-madina). This mercantile hub included ®fty-six separate markets and ®fty-three caravansaries.
14 Together, the new construction, when added to that formerly erected by the Mamluks, lay at the city's commercial heart. This commercial core consisted of over a square kilometer of interlocking streets, ®lled with shops, workshops, mosques, baths, and caravansaries, all under one contiguous roof. The Aleppo suq was a marvel to all who visited the city, and in their minds it was surpassed only by Istanbul's famed Kapalõ C Ë ars xõ.
It was not just the Ottomans who recognized Aleppo's commercial importance in the sixteenth century. In 1545, the Venetians transferred their consul for Syria from Damascus to Tripoli, closing down their direct operations in Damascus, and from Tripoli to Aleppo in 1548. This move came in recognition that the pepper and other spices from the East Indies were increasingly following the Persian Gulf/Euphrates route, rather than using the Red Sea passage that had favored Damascus. But Aleppo's markets also offered another attraction ± silk. Iranian silk from the Caspian Sea region of Gilan was especially prized by the Europeans, but locally produced silk from Antioch and the Euphrates, and from further a®eld in Anatolia was also available. Local weavers preferred the silk from Bursa and Tokat above all others and so they were rarely in competition with European bidders for Iranian silk. But their willingness to pay high prices for Anatolian silk often caused supply problems for the Empire's other silk weaving centers such as Istanbul and Bursa.
15
The presence of the silk market in Aleppo in the sixteenth century was not new. The city had emerged as the market of choice for the Armenian merchants bringing Iranian silk to the west in the ®fteenth century. The reason for their choice of Aleppo over its competitors was largely pragmatic; it was closer to their center in Julfa on the Araxes River, the current border between Azerbaijan and Iran, than other comparable emporia. It 14 Andre Â Raymond, Grandes villes arabes a Á l'e Âpoque ottomane (Paris: 1985). 15 Damascus, Awamir al-Sultaniyya (hereafter AS), Aleppo vol. II, p. 124.
was also safer as central Anatolia often proved to be a violent place in the ®fteenth century. Although these merchants remained loyal to Aleppo throughout the sixteenth century, a changing economic and political climate in the seventeenth century would tempt them toward Aleppo's emerging rival for the trade ± Izmir.
The attraction of Aleppo's silk market was fueled by an upturn in the demand for silk in Europe as local textile manufacturing increased in northwestern Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. In London alone, it was estimated that the number of people employed in the manufacture of silk cloth rose from three hundred in 1600 to over ten thousand in 1640.
16 In the last decades before the Company's demise, however, the consulship in Aleppo was often vacant. The Dutch, following their European trading rivals, established a consul in Aleppo in 1613, but they never established a major trading presence in Aleppo. Rather, they preferred Izmir where they concentrated their commercial activity in the Levant. The lack of a consistent Dutch presence in Aleppo has been ascribed to the uncertainties of the silk trade in Syria and to the fact that the Dutch lacked the broadcloth which the English and French successfully bartered for silk in Aleppo. They, therefore, had to pay for their purchases in Aleppo with cash. Faced with a potential bullion drain if they were to remain competitive in Aleppo, the Dutch specialized instead on the primary products available in Izmir.
18
Aleppo had won its place as an international emporium largely because of its convenience for the caravans from the east. It was already an 16 established commercial center when the Europeans arrived in the Levant, thanks to the investments made by the Mamluk emirs in its commercial infrastructure. It could offer such amenities as public baths and wellmaintained caravansaries, as well as protection, to the merchants traveling with the caravans. Other incentives for traveling merchants to choose the city's markets as their ®nal destination were the ®ne locally produced cloth, soap, and leather work. These goods, as well as coffee brought into the city by pilgrims returning from the hajj, were purchased by the merchants from Iran or India and transported back on the camels which had brought the silk from Iran or indigo and printed cotton cloth from India via Basra. Despite the availability of these other goods, the major draw for the Iranian merchants was silver. Both local merchants and the Europeans were willing to pay for Iranian silk with bullion, although the English, in particular, sought to avoid doing so if at all possible. This created a continual eastward drain of specie throughout the Ottoman period, a potentially damaging economic reality of which the sultans were aware.
19 But while they reduced tariffs on imported bullion to encourage its import into their realm, the Ottomans never forbade its export.
As long as the potential for pro®table exchange remained possible, the caravans continued to wind their way to Aleppo carrying Iran's silk and the Europeans followed suit. One of the disadvantages facing Aleppo for trade with Europe, however, was that it, alone among the Levantine commercial cities that thrived in this period of exchange between East and West, was not a port. Initially, the Europeans opted to use the port facilities offered by Tripoli. Tripoli was, however, ultimately unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The most compelling were its distance from Aleppo, eight days by donkey or camel, and the conditions along the routes to the city. There were two possible caravan trails that led from Aleppo to Tripoli: an interior one that passed through the towns of Hama and Homs and a coastal one along the Mediterranean littoral. The ®rst option, although a part of the hajj route and, therefore, subject to the surveillance of, and protection by Ottoman forces, was often exposed to Bedouin attacks. The coastal route was not much safer as it was subject to exaction by Alawi clans operating out of their mountain redoubts.
Further weakening Tripoli's attraction for the Europeans was its government. For most of the sixteenth century, members of the Sayfa family held the governorship of Tripoli. This family provided the Turkoman paramount chieftains of the Kisrawan region of present day Lebanon and could raise a sizable army of mounted kinsmen at their beck and call. The family, their clan, and clients were only intermittently under direct Ottoman control as they had become adept at using the central government's weakness to promote their own interests. Outside the direct control of the Porte, they extracted as much revenue as they could from the Europeans. They then used this cash to secure their political position, by proffering bribes to Istanbul and gifts to their retainers.
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Faced with the drawbacks inherent in using Tripoli as a port due to its rulers and distance from Aleppo, the Europeans surreptitiously began to use the bay at Alexandretta (I Ç skenderun) as an anchorage for their ships. Despite the fact that its shoreline was a swamp infested by mosquitoes, the bay was only a three or four day mule journey from Aleppo. Furthermore, the pleasant hill town of Antioch broke the journey and provided shelter from marauders. Alexandretta held another advantage in that it was under the direct administration of the governors in Aleppo. Despite imperial orders to the contrary, they generally looked the other way as the Europeans off-loaded their goods in the bay. The motive behind this lax attitude was transparent. The governors could collect customs duties on the European imports twice: once in Alexandretta and again in Aleppo.
By 1590, the Europeans were almost exclusively using Alexandretta as their port for Aleppo. It was not until 1593, however, that an imperial order established a customs station there. Both the governor and local merchants in Aleppo welcomed this move which they had helped to engineer. It was bitterly resisted by the Sayfas who rightly saw the transfer as greatly reducing the attraction of their home base for trade. They succeeded in getting a counter-order closing Alexandretta down in 1605, but Aleppo was in open rebellion in that year and did not heed the Porte's directive. A second order was issued in 1609. The Europeans found the closure of Alexandretta intolerable and acted in a rare show of solidarity to bring pressure on the authorities in Istanbul for a reversal. Their efforts worked, as the customs station in Alexandretta was restored to operation in 1612.
21
From that date until 1939 when it was annexed into the Republic of Turkey, Alexandretta remained Aleppo's chief outlet to the Mediterranean. Although the Europeans built warehouses, homes, and even churches in Alexandretta, there was no local interest in developing the site and the port remained for most of the Ottoman period little more than a European village, a way station on the road to Aleppo.
The silk trade of the seventeenth century
Two major challenges to Aleppo's prosperity emerged at the start of the seventeenth century. The ®rst was locally based, brought on by the rebellion of the Kurdish chieftain Ali Canpulatog AElu. The second was unleashed by Shah Abbas (1587±1629) who sought to divert Iranian silk away from the Ottoman Empire, his ideological enemy. Although the rebellion of Ali Canpulatog AElu arose out of a personal grievance, it was also linked to Aleppo's importance as a commercial center. Ali and his uncle, Hu È seyin, had achieved a local renown that extended beyond their home town of Killis by organizing the defense of Aleppo against the janissaries from Damascus who had continued their tax-collecting activities in Aleppo throughout the sixteenth century. In 1599, Aleppo's governor, Hacc Ibrahim Pas xa, petitioned Istanbul to establish a permanent janissary garrison in the citadel. The bene®cial effect of the sultan's having granted Ibrahim Pas xa's request was immediate. The new garrison succeeded in resisting the Damascus based troops that year, but with the governor's removal from of®ce in the following year, the garrison was disbanded and chaos returned.
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Hu È seyin's tribesmen were drawn into the con¯ict in 1601 and again in 1603. In recognition that his forces were all that stood between order and anarchy in Aleppo, the sultan granted him the governorship of Aleppo province in 1603, the ®rst local ®gure to be so honored. His elevation was bitterly opposed by the governor already in place, Nasuh Pas xa, who reportedly fumed that if the sultan had appointed a black slave to replace him, he would acquiesce but he could not do so for a son of the Canpulats. This remark was interpreted by contemporary Ottoman historians as representing the resistance of a member of the Ottoman military elite to a tribal upstart. His resistance was more than verbal, however. In order to claim his of®ce, Hu È seyin's troops had to ®ght their way into the city. The question of which governor would command the citadel was eventually resolved by a delegation of local notables who insisted that the sultan's writ be recognized and Nasuh Pas xa withdrew.
The step of awarding a Kurdish chieftain the governorship of one of the Empire's largest cities came, no doubt, as the sultan recognized that his administration no longer possessed the military might to secure his vast domains. Indeed this period in Ottoman history witnessed a series of provincial revolts known collectively as Cela Ãlõ Ã in which the very future of the dynasty was threatened. In response, the state had to rely on locally recruited military forces to maintain a semblance of order in the provinces, even if that meant a reduction in the sultan's ability to claim absolute sovereignty. Hu È seyin's well-armed Kurdish kinsmen had moved to ®ll the political void in northern Syria and the state reciprocated by awarding him a governorship. Istanbul remained wary of Hu È seyin's local power-base, however, and shortly thereafter, ordered him to aid the Ottoman campaign against Iran in 1605. Before his Kurdish forces could arrive at the front, the Ottoman army suffered a major defeat at Urumia. When Hu Èseyin showed up on the battle®eld after the debacle, the angry, defeated general accused him of treason. He was summarily executed and his head sent to the Porte.
The leadership of the clan passed to Ali, who raised the standard of revolt in revenge for what he considered to be the unjusti®ed execution of his uncle. Seeking to secure the trade routes of northern Syria, Ali quickly moved southward and defeated the rival Sayfa family. In control of northern Syria and with Aleppo as his capital, Ali entered into direct negotiations with the various European consuls in the city, guaranteeing them that trade would be protected and unlawful exaction and bribery ended under his regime. For two years the sultan played a careful diplomatic game with Ali. At one point, he even recognized Ali's governorship of Aleppo. But as soon as the sultan could raise an army to suppress the rebel, he dispatched it against Aleppo in the autumn of 1607. Defeated on the ®eld of battle, Ali accepted the Ottoman terms for surrender. He was taken to Rumania where he held a titular government of®ce until his execution for treason in 1610 at Belgrade.
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After Ali's ignominious departure from the region, the Canpulatog AElu clan split in two when one collateral branch moved to Lebanon where they would re-emerge as the Druze clan of Janbulad. The remainder of the family stayed in the Jabal al-Kurd, astride the current Syrian±Turkish frontier, where they dominated the politics of Killis down through the eighteenth century. Although Ali has remained a mythic hero in the Kurdish ballads sung in the Killis region until the present, the Kurds never again posed a serious challenge for the political dominance of northern Syria. Nevertheless, the period of the Canpulatog AElu rebellion demonstrated to the Ottoman leadership that Aleppo was far too important to be allowed to slip into autonomy, much less independence. To ensure this, the Ottoman state rotated the city's governors frequently to disallow precisely the type of power base that governors were able to establish for themselves in other parts of the sultan's Arab domains. While this policy helped to heighten the political anarchy in the city's streets in the eighteenth century, it prevented the rise of any locally based political force that could challenge directly the sultan's ultimate authority over the city and its inhabitants. For the sultans, institutionalized anarchy was better than order, especially if political order might lead to secession.
Shah Abbas proved a more serious challenge to Aleppo's status as a major commercial center than did Canpulatog AElu Ali Pas xa. At the close of the sixteenth century, the Europeans no longer found the cost of spices available in Aleppo's markets to be competitive with those on offer in either Lisbon or Amsterdam as the cost of sea transport had ®nally undercut that of the caravans.
24 Instead, they began to focus their acquisitive intentions in Aleppo almost entirely on Iranian silk. This is not to say that spices no longer followed the ancient trade routes to the Mediterranean. For at least another century and a half, spices and coffee brought by caravan were still cheaper in Syria than those brought into the Levant by European ships. Nevertheless, although the English factors continued to monitor the costs of spices and coffee in Aleppo throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, silk, either Iranian or Syrian, was the principal commodity of interest for the English merchants in Aleppo. Other items purchased in the city's markets, locally produced raw silk and cotton yarn, as well as gallnuts from Kurdistan, were of secondary importance and most probably would not have alone drawn European traders to the city.
The ambitions of Shah Abbas threatened Aleppo's central role in the silk trade as he sought to divert the transport of Iranian silk away from his arch-rivals, the Ottomans. He was abetted in this by the actions of European trading companies, such as the English East India Company and the Netherlands VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), which held charters from their respective governments for trade in the Persian Gulf, but not the Mediterranean. The stock-holders of these companies viewed the prosperous Iranian silk trade as an integral component of the Indian Ocean trading zone and they sought to divert the shah's silk to Persian Gulf seaports from where it could be loaded on to their ships. Their attempts were resisted by the smaller English Levant Company and its sister Dutch Directie van den Levantschen Handel en de Navigatie op de Middellandsche Zee (Directorate of Levantine Trade and Navigation in the Mediterranean).
All the cards were in Shah Abbas's hands, however, and for a decade between 1619 and Shah Abbas's death in 1629, very little Iranian silk reached Aleppo.
25 Faced with a dramatic demise of the silk trade in Aleppo, the Europeans contemplated closing down their operations in the city. The French and Venetians attempted to open their own direct trading links to Iran, but the more powerfully armed Dutch and English commercial¯eets denied them access beyond the Straits of Hormuz. The French, in particular, began to view Lebanese raw silk as a practical substitute for that of Iran and many French trading houses shifted their factors to Sidon and Tripoli so as to be closer to its source. The English, almost alone, maintained a stoic presence in Aleppo, but their factors suffered sustained losses on their investments for over a decade. With Shah Abbas's death, however, trade resumed its former channels, largely due to the wishes of the Iranian merchants, and Aleppo re-emerged, as the primary market for Iranian silk.
The chief purveyors of Iran's silk in this period were members of the Armenian community of New Julfa, that had been built by Shah Abbas outside of his capital, Isfahan, after he had destroyed the original Julfa. Abbas enhanced the central role the Julfa merchants already played in the trade by giving them a virtual monopoly over the marketing of his country's silk output. In this way, he established the merchants of New Julfa as``his merchants'' whom he apparently hoped would increase his revenues while reducing those that would accrue to the Ottoman Treasury.
26 Their importance to Aleppo's trade was recognized by the Ottoman authorities who by 1690, granted the Julfa community in Aleppo several exemptions from customary Muslim legal practice in regards to paying the tax assessed on non-Muslim ( jizya) and inheritance procedures, 27 and by the English Levant Company factors who referred to all Iranian merchants indiscriminately as``Chefalines'' in their letters.
The court records of Aleppo provide evidence, however, that Anatolian Armenians and Christian Arabs from Aleppo were also involved in the trade, traveling to Iran on their own, or as agents for Muslim investors in Aleppo. Interestingly, Muslim merchants from either side of the frontier rarely traveled between the two often warring states. There were isolated exceptions to this observation, as in the case of the disposition of the estates of two Iranian Muslim merchants who died en route to Aleppo from Baghdad in 1610 and the registration of a settlement of a trade agreement between a merchant and his two Aleppo Muslim agents who had returned from Iran to the city in 1707. 28 These are, however, exceptions that accentuate the general trend. The paucity of such cases registered in the courts when compared with a very active Muslim involvement with trade to Egypt or India, for example, is striking. This suggests that Muslim merchants on either side of the Sunni-Shi«a religious divide were wary about crossing into the domain of the``heretic,'' although Iranian Shi«a merchants continued to visit Baghdad and were found even as far a®eld as Bursa.
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In return for Iran's silk, the Europeans offered the Armenians silver specie or woolen broadcloth. The broadcloth was used in Syria to make outer garments for both men and women, and in Iran as cheap¯oor coverings. The almost insatiable demand for broadcloth in the Levant helped fuel a nascent English textile industry. By the end of the seventeenth century, the English clearly dominated the European side of the trade in Aleppo. Laurant d'Arvieux, the French consul in the city in 1683, estimated France imported a million livres of goods from Aleppo, while England's trade amounted to six million. This total trade volume for France was further reduced to only 400,000 livres in value by 1700. 30 The decline of French commercial activity in Aleppo was the apparent result of several conditions: the increasing availability of Iranian silk in Izmir, the redeployment of French merchants to exploit the Lebanese market, and the inability of French broadcloths to compete with the English product among the Aleppine consumers. In contrast, Aleppo accounted for almost half the total imports to London from the eastern Mediterranean carried by the Levant Company in the second half of the seventeenth century. Aleppo's importance for England's trade was re¯ected by the number of Englishmen acting as factors in the city. Henry Maundrell, the English chaplain to the Levant Company in the city, reported over forty of his countrymen resident there in 1697, while only sixteen French merchants and two Dutchmen lived in the city. 31 We learn from the city's Islamic court records that there were resident merchant communities in the city from North Africa, India, and Bukhara, as well as the Europeans and the Iranian Armenians. The Indian community, in particular, seems to have received a degree of of®cial recognition from the Ottoman state. In 1639, they produced a fatwa ( judicial ruling) from Aleppo's mufti which stated that all the members of the community were Muslim and therefore exempt from paying the jizya.
32 Such nonOttoman Muslim communities were, for the most part, composed of smallscale peddlers whose economic activity was overshadowed by that of the Europeans and the Armenians. There was at least one exception to this generalization as well, however.
In 1645, an Indian merchant named Muhammad Nasir was involved in lengthy negotiations over the customs duties for which he was assessed in Aleppo. From the testimony registered locally and a ®nal ruling on the case registered in Istanbul, we learn that he served as an agent for an Indian prince named Mir Zarif. For his patron, Muhammad Nasir had brought 50 loads of indigo worth 12,500 ghurush that were sold in Istanbul and another 40,000 ghurush-worth of unspeci®ed Indian goods shipped out of Alexandretta for Venice. Returning from Venice, he had imported goods worth 60,000 ghurush that he intended to take by caravan to Basra and from there to India. 33 The volume of those transactions dwarfed anything registered by either European or Iranian merchants in the seventeenth century, but at the same time, it survives as the only recorded example of a large-scale transaction conducted by an Indian merchant in the city.
As signi®cant as``international'' trade was to Aleppo's commercial fortunes in the seventeenth century, it should not overshadow our appreciation of Aleppo's role as a regional trading center in the same period. Although the seventeenth century was clearly more violent for northern Syria than the preceding century of Ottoman rule, the two centuries taken together represent what might be termed a pax ottomanica in the region. Tribal elements were largely kept in check by Ottoman troops and trade moved, more or less, freely throughout the Empire. As a result, merchants from throughout the Empire visited the city bringing linen cloth and rice from Egypt, coffee from Yemen, died fruits and silk cloth from Damascus, mohair from Ankara, and woolens from both Mosul and Salonika. Aleppo was, in turn, renowned for the quality of olive oil available in its markets and its by-product, soap, was exported as far a®eld as Cairo and Istanbul. It also had a reputation for the high quality of its alaja cloth, a satin mixture of cotton and silk. Contracts registered in the courts, in turn, speak of Aleppo-based merchants who set out for India, Iran, Baghdad, Egypt, and the numerous smaller market towns of southeastern Anatolia. Although this side of Aleppo's commercial life was rarely noted in the letters that the European factors wrote home, we must assume based on the preponderance both in the volume of contracts relating to such``internal'' trade and the amounts of money involved when compared to similar registry of contracts from the Iranian±European silk trade, Aleppo's prosperity in this era was linked to the former, even though the latter provided the basis for the city's international reputation.
The city's attraction to foreign merchants was undoubtedly aided by the relative tranquillity it enjoyed after the revolt of Canpulatog AElu Ali Pas xa. In 1657, the city's governor, Abaza Hasan Pas xa rose in revolt against the newly installed grand vizier, Ko È pru È lu È Mehmed Pas xa. His revolt was put down in 1659 and Wolffgang Aigen, a German merchant resident in the city, reported that commerce in Aleppo, was only marginally affected by the insurrection and quickly returned to its normal routine after the rebel governor's death.
34 A decade after the revolt, the incomparable Turkish traveler, Evliya Ã C Ë elebi, visited the city on his way to the holy cities in the Hijaz. He described it as a bustling commercial city where all sorts of goods were available and that boasted sixty-one mosques, 217 Qur'an schools, 5,700 shops in the central market, 7,000 gardens, 105 coffee-shops (one of which he claimed could seat 2,000 patrons at a time), and 176 Su® convents. Its people, he said, were frugal and god-fearing, even if the Arabic they spoke was inelegant.
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Evliya Ã gave the city's population at the time of his visit as 400,000. Although Aleppo's commercial fortunes in this period were re¯ected in the city's population which reached its zenith in the second half of the seventeenth century, this was, like much of what Evliya Ã reported in his account, an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the city's pull, coupled with the push of a growing insecurity in the countryside, helped fuel an expansion in the population that was unparalleled in the city's history until the twentieth century. From approximately 80,000 inhabitants in the last decades of the sixteenth century, the population grew steadily, despite recurring and often devastating visitations of cholera and plague, to about 120,000 at midseventeenth century.
36 This would make Aleppo the third largest urban center in the Ottoman Empire, after Istanbul and Cairo.
Given the high mortality rate caused by disease, this large urban population had to be sustained by a steady in¯ux of rural migrants from throughout southeastern Anatolia and northern and central Syria who sought protection, fortune, or both, within the city's walls. Correspondingly, this rural to urban migration helped to fuel a downward cycle leading to a major depopulation of much of rural Syria, a situation that became a cliche Â in Western descriptions of the region. Typical is the following made by the Abbe Â Carre Â who visited northern Syria in 1672:
A very old man, who was nearly a hundred years old, told me that this country used to be one of the richest, most fertile, and well-populated parts of all Syria, and that, when he was young, he could count 50 towns and 400 villages, which now lay in ruins for a stretch of ®fteen or twenty leagues around. This was due to the bad government of the Ottoman empire, whose policy was to destroy the country for fear of strangers mastering it, as I have remarked with astonishment throughout the empire. They seem by this means to contribute to their own ruin, for they now have nothing left but their chief towns, and even these could not subsist without the help of foreign nations, who by their trade, merchandise, caravans, and travelers contribute the principal revenues of those places.
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Although the Abbe Â's observations of rural population decline are con®rmed by Ottoman sources, he was wrong about the lack of Ottoman concern over rural¯ight. Provincial towns and villages¯ooded Istanbul with petitions asking to have either their tax assessments reduced or, failing that, the right to collect taxes from former residents who had moved to Aleppo. Despite Ottoman secular (kanun) law to the contrary, Islamic law 35 Evliya Ã C Ë elebi, Evliya Ã C Ë elebi Seyahatnamesi, ed. Mehmed Zõllõ Ãog AElu (Istanbul, 1984 
